The present collection addresses a number of issues in the semantic interpretation of modal and temporal expressions. Despite the variety the papers exhibit both in the selection of topics and the choice of formal frameworks, they are interconnected through several overarching themes that are at the centre of much ongoing research. The purpose of this brief introduction is to put the papers into context and draw the reader's attention to some of these connections. The topics we will discuss in the remainder are: counterfactuals, causality, partiality, compositionality of conditionals, and context dependence.
(1) a. If that match had been scratched, it would have lighted.
b. If the match had been wet and scratched, it would have lighted.
The resulting theory correctly invalidates certain inferences involving counterfactuals, such as that from (1a) to (1b). Under the classical interpretation this inference would be valid; but clearly (1a) can be true while (1b) is false.
In accounting for the logical behaviour of counterfactuals, ordering semantics was a significant step forward and must be considered an unqualified success. At the same time, many authors have voiced doubts as to whether, in itself, it really amounts to a semantic analysis, given that it delegates the most difficult questions to the unanalysed similarity relation. Thus van Fraassen (1976) noted: 'To the question what principles govern deductive reasoning involving conditionals, Stalnaker and Lewis give exact answers. But the validity of an argument does not depend on whether its premises are true; and indeed, Stalnaker and Lewis have not notably increased our ability to decide whether particular conditionals are true or false ' (p. 266) .
To this day, there is little consensus on the question of how the interpretation of counterfactuals depends on the facts or, more semantically put, the truth values of atomic and truth-functional sentences. An early statement of this question is due to Goodman (1947) , who saw no way of giving a non-circular logical explanation for the fact that speakers consistently judge (1a) true and (2) false.
(2) If that match had been scratched, it would have been wet.
The consequent of (1a) follows from the antecedent and the fact that the match was dry (ignoring certain other factors, such as the presence of oxygen). The consequent of (2) follows from the same antecedent and the fact that the match did not light. Why do most speakers consider the fact that the match was dry, but not the fact that the match did not light, relevant to their deliberations of what would have been the case if it had been scratched?
Within ordering semantics, the question becomes how exactly the similarity relation ought to be specified, and whether it can be reduced to some more basic notion. The proponents of the theory have made only tentative suggestions in this regard. Lewis (1973a Lewis ( , 1979 proposed to use judgments about counterfactuals as empirical evidence about the way speakers assess similarity, and put forth his well-known hierarchy of 'miracles', which he conceived of as more or less drastic deviations from the actual course of events. Stalnaker (1968 Stalnaker ( , 1984 offered his 'projection strategy' as an alternative which gives more importance to epistemic considerations, explaining similarity between worlds in terms of the logic of belief update and revision. A third possible strategy would be to take certain dependencies between facts in a possible world as basic and formulate the semantic analysis of counterfactuals in terms of those.
One framework in which this latter approach has been explored is premise semantics, originally proposed by Veltman (1976) and Kratzer (1981) . Here the semantics of counterfactuals makes reference to premise sets, maximally consistent sets of propositions compatible with the antecedent. Premise semantics provides a way to formulate hypotheses as to which truths are given up in evaluating counterfactuals. Broadly speaking, the idea is that speakers do not view facts as mutually independent: some (but not all) facts are affected by manipulations of other facts in hypothetical reasoning. Formally, this means that some logically possible sets of premises may be irrelevant to the truth or falsehood of a given counterfactual. The question then is what determines the selection of the relevant premise sets. For Veltman (1976) , this selection was driven by epistemic preferences. Kratzer (1981 Kratzer ( , 1989 Kratzer ( , 2002 , on the other hand, has tried to define it in terms of assumptions about the internal structure of the world at which the counterfactual is evaluated.
Two papers and one discussion note in this collection address directly the semantics of counterfactuals and the proper construction of premise sets. 'On the Lumping Semantics of Counterfactuals', by Makoto Kanazawa, Stefan Kaufmann and Stanley Peters, discusses Kratzer's (1989) attempt to cast the intuition about the dependence between facts into a precise logical form and relate it to assumptions speakers appear to make about the structure of the world. Kratzer's proposal and the underlying situation-semantic apparatus have been influential in the field, being based on intuitions that many authors find plausible. What Kanazawa et al. show is that despite its appeal, the approach is plagued by certain logical problems in its formal implementation, which are not obvious at first but lead to a number of unwelcome consequences.
It is the particular formalization of lumping developed in Kratzer (1989) , along with the workings of premise semantics, that leads to the triviality problems discussed in the paper. Kanazawa et al. leave open the question of whether the prima facie plausible idea can be preserved in a modified version of lumping semantics, or whether an altogether different approach is called for. This question is important, and the theory deserves that it be resolved. Kanazawa et al. show where the cracks run in the logical foundation of the most explicit formalization currently available. Angelika Kratzer, in her reaction paper 'Constraining Premise Sets for Counterfactuals', argues that by further developing the theory in directions she has indicated in more recent work, it may ultimately be possible to avoid the problems.
In 'Making Counterfactual Assumptions', Frank Veltman gives the beginnings of a compositional analysis of counterfactuals and a new version of premise semantics for counterfactuals. Veltman takes seriously the observation, made by Tichý (1976) , that local mismatches of facts can make for big differences in the truth of counterfactuals. Like Kratzer, he aims for a semantics of counterfactuals that pins down more precisely which facts count and which do not in evaluating the consequences of a hypothetical assumption. He makes a crucial distinction between particular facts and general laws; the latter do not depend on the particular world of evaluation. The counterfactual assumptions an agent can make are limited to those that are compatible with the laws.
In Veltman's formal system, situations assign truth values to atomic propositions, and laws complete situational bases into worlds. A basis for a world is a situation which contains all and only the basic, mutually independent facts distinguishing that world from others. A situation smaller than a basis, on the other hand, can 'grow' into different possible worlds. It is situations of this kind that determine the truth values of counterfactuals. A counterfactual with a false antecedent (the only case Veltman considers) is evaluated at a given world by reducing a basis of that world to a situation which admits the antecedent. This process involves the removal of some propositions, which, Veltman maintains, take others in their train: When a proposition is retracted from a world, all the independent facts that led to its truth, as well as its consequences under the laws, are retracted as well.
Veltman in fact formulates the meaning of counterfactuals in terms of update conditions on belief states, whereas our informal description here is given in truth conditional terms. As Veltman notes, update distributes over worlds in this way only when the laws are fixed. Thus the reader should be alerted that our description here covers only this special case.
CAUSALITY
Kratzer's appeal to 'lumping' and Veltman's notion of some facts 'bringing others in their train' are but two ways of placing constraints on counterfactual inferences. Another solution appeals to causal relations, which in recent years has risen to new prominence in adjacent fields, such as artificial intelligence and psychology (Ortiz, 1999a,b; Pearl, 2000) , and was applied in the interpretation of conditionals by Kaufmann (2005) and others. Here again, we face unresolved foundational questions: What are the relata of causal relations? What are their logical properties? How do they enter into speakers' reasoning about particular sentences? How are they utilized in the absence of full knowledge about the relevant facts?
The importance of an adequate notion of causality is by no means restricted to counterfactuals. Jerry Hobbs, in the paper 'Toward a Useful Concept of Causality for Lexical Semantics', starts out by noting that it is required for the analysis of a wide variety of expressions, and moves on to propose an account of its logical properties that is independent of any particular linguistic application. Central to the proposal is the notion of a causal complex, a collection of eventualities which in their totality are responsible for the effect, and none of which is irrelevant to the occurrence of the effect.
Sceptical about the possibility of giving a complete definition of the concept, Hobbs' goal is to identify general conditions on causal complexes that support linguistically relevant inferences. Using techniques from non-monotonic logic, Hobbs weakens inferences which go against the direction of causality to ensure that they do not lead to counterintuitive consequences in causal reasoning. Along the way, he develops a number of auxiliary notions that should prove independently interesting, especially that of a closest world, which is similar but not equivalent to that of the Stalnaker/Lewis theory of counterfactuals. This raises new questions, such as what exactly the relationship is and whether Hobbs' notion of closeness may offer a causal explication of Stalnaker's.
FROM EVENT DESCRIPTIONS AND TIME TO WORLDS
Both Veltman and Hobbs make use of partial entities-situations in one case, eventualities in the other-as well as worlds, and largely abstract away from time. Veltman takes worlds and situations to be total and partial functions, respectively, from atomic formulas to truth values. Hobbs appeals to an ontology of eventualities, construed rather broadly as facts that may or may not hold in a particular world. For example, in addition to the eventuality of some basic property holding of an individual, there are negative eventualies-the eventuality of another eventuality not existing-and what we may call modal eventualities, such as the eventuality of another eventuality being hypothetical. It is fair to say that the exact nature of a model-theoretic interpretation for such ontological entities is an open question. Hobbs considers time with regard to temporal order and causal flow, but does not in general address change through time, i.e. the fact that both an eventuality and its negation can be realized in a world at different times.
In the paper 'Schedules in a Temporal Interpretation of Modals', Tim Fernando approaches temporal matters constructively, treating eventuality descriptions rather than worlds as primitives. He formulates both worlds and eventualities as relations between time and eventuality descriptions-relations he calls schedules. Schedules ground eventuality descriptions in time, and, as such, amount to temporal realizations of eventuality descriptions. Insofar as eventuality descriptions can be understood as intensional notions and schedules as extensional notions, Fernando's formation of schedules from eventuality descriptions reverses the Montagovian tradition of deriving intensions from extensions (by abstracting over a world parameter).
Of particular interest in the paper is the fact that schedules satisfy not just atomic eventuality descriptions, but also descriptions with temporal and modal operators. Fernando argues that satisfaction need not rest on worlds, even for modal formulas involving epistemic or historical alternatives, and offers a reformulation of the temporal interpretation of modals proposed in Condoravdi (2002) .
The paper generalizes the notion of eventive, stative and temporal properties by defining a satisfaction predicate ('forcing') that is persistent relative to a partial order on schedules. Persistence then allows one to reconstruct worlds from certain so-called generic sets of schedules.
A COMPOSITIONAL SEMANTICS FOR INDICATIVE CONDITIONALS
It has been widely accepted since the work of Lewis (1975) and Kratzer (1979) that the semantic contribution of if-clauses is to restrict the domain of an overt or covert modal operator with scope over the consequent clause. The question remains, however, how this restriction comes about in the process of compositional interpretation. Von Fintel (1994) proposed that if-clauses may act as modifiers of consequent clauses, but left open the details of a compositional analysis. Another largely unaddressed issue regarding the meaning of indicative conditionals is the interpretation of Present and Past tenses in their antecedents and consequents (a notable exception is Crouch 1993). The variety of temporal readings and the semantic interdependence between the tenses in antecedent and consequent are illustrated by (3) and (4).
(3) a. If he comes out smiling, the interview went well.
b. If he came out smiling, the interview went well. c. If he went in smiling, the interview will go well.
(4) a. If he is at the interview (now/when we call him), he will be late for the meeting. b. If he is at the interview, the interviews are on schedule.
Note, for instance, that the Past tense in the consequent of (3a) indicates backshifting from a future time, wherease those in the antecedents of (3b,c) and in the consequent of (3b), on their most natural interpretations, indicate backshifting from the time of utterance. Similarly, the Present tense in the antecedent of (3a) calls for a forwardshifted interpretation, while that in the antecedent and consequent of (4b) indicates overlap with the time of utterance and that in the antecedent of (4a) is compatible with either interpretation.
In 'Conditional Truth and Future Reference', Stefan Kaufmann proposes a compositional semantics for indicative conditionals which brings together the modal and temporal elements of their interpretation. He treats if-clauses as modifiers of the consequent, with the desired effect of restricting the modal base associated with the latter. Regarding temporal interpretation, he makes the (at first sight striking) claim that the tenses in the antecedent and consequent of indicative conditionals receive the same interpetation as in isolation, and demonstrates that this assumption helps explain a number of otherwise puzzling facts. He shows how the same basic meaning can give rise to predictive and nonpredictive, metaphysical and doxastic readings, depending on contextual parameters and the choice of modal base for the consequent, and explains why non-predictive readings tend to be associated with doxastic modality.
The main technical innovation of Kaufmann's paper is to take apart the various parameters involved in the interpretation of a modal and then have them enter the process of compositional interpretation separately at different stages, rather than being fixed once at the top level by the context. In this way, a modal can be transformed into a modal-temporal operator by an if-clause.
CONTEXT DEPENDENCE AND DYNAMIC INTERPRETATION
Moving above the level of individual sentences, we face the inextricable context dependence of modal and conditional expressions. Not only is their interpretation determined and constrained by a variety of contextual parameters, but they in turn operate on the context, affecting the interpretation of subsequent utterances. The cross-sentential dependencies that result from such interactions are subsumed under the label 'modal subordination'. Some examples are given in (5) through (7). b. It would be parked outside.
In each of these mini-sequences, the (b)-sentence carries certain presuppositions (triggered by he in (5b), too in (6b), it in (7b)). One question that such examples raise is why the second sentence is felicitous in the given context, even though on the face of it, its presuppositions are not satisfied: For instance, the existence of a thief is not asserted in (5a), nor does (6a) assert that Mary (or anyone else) is coming to the party. Furthermore, (5b) and (7b) are intuitively interpreted as the consequents of conditionals whose antecedents are (5a) and (7a), respectively. A variety of proposals for dealing with this phenomenon have been put forth in the literature. Common to all of them is a dynamic perspective on the interaction between sentences and their contexts of interpretation, but regarding the nature of this interaction, we can discern several different approaches. Roberts (1989) appealed to complex inferences and accommodation to explain how sentences like (5b) are interpreted. Others view the dependency as essentially anaphoric (Frank 1996; Geurts 1998; Kibble 1998) . Such approaches have been criticized for being too unconstrained and unable to account for the fact that the dependency is, with very few exceptions, limited to the immediately preceding discourse context. Still others draw a crucial distinction between those contexts which result from an update with a licensing expression (such as 5a-7a) and give rise to modal subordination for that reason, and those contexts which do not. Kaufmann (2000) made one such proposal, arguing that this approach is better suited to account for the locality of modal subordination.
In the paper 'A Modal Analysis of Presupposition and Modal Subordination', Robert van Rooij offers a novel approach in the same conceptual vein, addressing a wider range of data and employing a leaner formal framework. Contexts are represented as modal accessibility relations. An update with a modally subordinating expression results in a context with special properties (rather than a stack of multiple contexts, as Kaufmann would have it). The evaluation of presupposition-carrying sentences in such contexts is spelled out in a two-dimensional framework which is inspired by Karttunen and Peters' (1979) account of conversational implicature, but not subject to certain well-documented problems afflicting the latter. The proposal should therefore be of independent interest.
